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The thesis focuses on the question of Public Ownership Reform from the 
perspective of the incomplete contract. What it concerns is that under what kind 
of condition the public ownership is appropriate. We reappraoch the only form 
of public ownership in our country, and by analyzing the characteristics of 
different fields, we put forward some corresponding suggestions to the Public 
Ownership Reform. 
According to the theory of contact, the allocation of ownership is not 
important if the contract is complete. In reality, however, the contract is usually 
not complete. In this case the allocation of ownership is of critical importance. 
The different allocations of ownership have different incentives to innovation 
for managers, and the result of welfare and efficiency is also different. The 
trade-off of welfare and efficiency determines the choice of ownership structures. 
At the same time, the contract completeness and competition have different 
effects on the allocation of ownership. When the key variables of some products 
or services can be described in detail and enforced effectively, then government 
will use contracts or regulations to constrain the private providers instead of 
using ownership. The effective competition can constrain the actions of the 
self-interest oriented private providers and weaken the role of ownership and 
regulation. But attentions need to be paid to the efficiency of contracts or 
regulations and competitions (bid and competition to consumers). 
It is too ideal to assume that government was the maximizer of social 
welfare, while in reality the politicians are usually self-interest oriented. 
Therefore, we also give our concerns to the impact of self-interest politicians on 
public ownership, and the effect of competition in political market on the 
allocation of ownership. The conclusion is that the privatization is an effective 
measure to constrain the actions of the self-interest oriented politicians. In 
addition, strengthening external supervision such as taxpayers is the key to 













the necessary choice currently. 
We apply the conclusions mentioned above to study the Public Ownership 
Reform in the different fields: competitive field, naturally monopoly field and 
public service field. We propose some advices to improve the reform. The basic 
conclusions are as the following: competition can effectively restrain the private 
suppliers in competitive field, and the private ownership has competitive 
advantage; in the natural monopolistic field the choice of ownership structure 
needs to balance the efficiency and social welfare, and attention needs to be 
given to the efficiency of regulations and competition, especially the 
characteristics of our executive monopoly; in the public service field we need to 
choose different supply patterns according to the characteristic of services and 
weaken the role of government direct supply. 
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第一章  导论 
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① 当然，介于两种之间还存在许多“中间模式”，如规制的引入，这些我们将在第二章中进行分析。 
② 虽然撒切尔政府可能不是第一个进行大规模民营化改革的，如德国在 1961 年进行的“非国有化”









































                                                        
① 这里的“公有产权”是区别于“国家所有权”的，因为我们考察的是政府实际拥有剩余控制权的
情形。 
































































































































































                                                        
① 当然，在私有企业中，所有者与管理者的目标是不可能完全一致的。但是，相对于政府来说，它
们间的目标是较为一致的。 
② Shirley 和 Walsh（2000）告诫到，对这一治理方法的分析需要注意在市场接管很少发生的国家或
时期内意义并不大。另外，即使在竞争性领域，市场接管可能经常发生，但是在非竞争性领域，接
管却是很少的，从而对公有企业和私有企业的影响差别并不大。 
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